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The authors analyze the NATO relations with Sweden and Finland, the neutral states 
of Northern Europe, in 1991—2016. The authors emphasize that Finland and Sweden 
have always been of high strategic importance for NATO and the EU defence policy. The 
authors investigate the main areas of cooperation between NATO and the non-aligned 
countries of Northern Europe and describe the prerequisites, prospects and possible con-
sequences of Sweden and Finland’s membership in NATO. Special attention is paid to the 
evolution of the policy of neutrality of these countries before and after their accession to 
the European Union. The aim of this research is to assess the evolution of political views 
of Sweden and Finland on the development and implementation of the policy of neutrality 
in 1991—2016. To achieve this goal, the authors use comparative analysis to explore 
the stance of the governments of Sweden and Finland on the cooperation with NATO 
or membership in it. The authors reflect on the concepts of “Finlandization”, “freedom 
from alliances”, “neutrality” and “secret alliance”, which are often used in academic 
descriptions of the evolution of the position of both countries towards NATO. The au-
thors hold that Finland and Sweden may become NATO members only if there is a direct 
threat to their security. Russian politics in the region may provoke them to take such a 
step. A referendum on joining the bloc seems to be highly unlikely; even though after the 
Crimean events, the number of NATO supporters in the two countries increased, they re-
mained a minority. The authors conclude that both countries are involved in a “creeping” 
integration with NATO after they have become actors of the EU defence strategy. There 
is a minimum probability of Sweden and Finland becoming full members of the Alliance. 
However, the traditional policy of neutrality of both countries is often compromised, par-
ticularly towards Russia.
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Introduction
Sweden and Finland have been playing a special role in complex interaction 
mechanism between NATO and neutral states. Both countries hold an import-
ant military and strategic position. Sweden controls the major part of the Baltic 
sea western coast, connecting Norway and Denmark, and together with the latter 
controlling the exit from the Baltic to the Northern sea. Finland, spanning 1265 
km from south to north along the Russian border, controls the northern shore of 
the Gulf of Finland. While remaining outside the NATO structures, both states 
interact with the Alliance actively on various issues, e.g. military and intelligence 
information exchange, peacekeeping operations, including enterprises under the 
UN auspices. In this way the two countries contribute to NATO activities, partic-
ularly those held along the northern frontiers of Russia, despite being formally 
free from any alliances. 
The purpose of the paper is to reveal grounds for Sweden and Finland to join 
NATO that emerged between 1991 and 2016. The issue first appeared on the 
agenda after their acceptance to the EU and admission of the nearby Baltic states 
to NATO in 2004.  As the result of these two events, Sweden and Finland have 
tight contacts with their neighbors who are included into the Alliance, follow 
the EU joint security and foreign policy and are involved in the united European 
defense area for the US and Canadian allies. 
Methodology and methods
 “The main condition for preserving stability in Northern Europe is Swedish 
and Finnish non-alignment to military alliances” is a dominating thesis in Rus-
sian political thought and historiography towards the issue [1, p. 71]. This per-
sistent opinion makes an independent survey of the non-alignment policy largely 
impossible. Over the last few years, especially after Crimea merged into Rus-
sia, numerous critical articles have appeared regarding the tentative admission 
of Sweden and Finland to NATO1. Nonetheless, the issue remains a subject for 
debate and a topic for academic inquiry, as demonstrated by the present research. 
Sweden and Finland have a long history of relations with Russia in various 
forms. Of these, the military factor remained one of the crucial ones, as it was 
1 Hasselbach, K., Alekseeva, Yu. Finlandia i Shvecija stremyatsya bolee tesno sotrudnichat’ 
s NATO [Finland and Sweden towards closer cooperation with NATO] // Deutsche Welle. 
31.08.2014. URL: https://www.dw.com/ru/финляндия-и-швеция-стремятся-более-
тесно-сотрудничать-с-нато/a-17890512 (access date: 12.02.2020) (in Russ.); Sergey Shoigu 
poobeshal otvetit’ na vtyagivanie Finlandii I Shvecii v NATO [Sergey Shoigu promised a 
response towards the Swedish and Finnish NATO pull] // Kommersant. 24.07.2018. URL: 
https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3695400 (access date: 12.02.2020) (in Russ.); Gritzai, Yu. 
Finlandia, Shvecija i SShA ukrepliajut voennoe sotrudnichestvo [Finland, Sweden and the 
US to strengthen military cooperation] // Kommersant. 09.05.2018. URL: https://www.kom-
mersant.ru/doc/3623863 (access date: 12.02.2020) (in Russ.)
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connected with geopolitical interests of Sweden, Russia, and, as of 1917, Finland, 
as well as with interests of third parties, such as France, Great Britain, Germany, 
and the USA. It created tension in Europe and brought the situation closer to a 
conflict. As a result of its struggle with Russia, Denmark and Prussia, by 1721 
Sweden had lost both its dominating role and unilateral control over the Baltic 
sea. Stockholm had ceased to be one of the key players in the Baltic area in 1808 
with the loss of Finland and lost even more of its power in 1905, when the Swed-
ish-Norwegian union collapsed. 
Sweden remained neutral during both World wars with significant conces-
sions in favor of Germany, especially when it came to trade in strategic minerals 
and military transit via Lapland, which made Swedish foreign policy a subject 
to criticism both within the country and abroad. After the attempt to create a 
Scandinavian Defense Union under the Swedish leadership with the participation 
of Norway and Denmark failed in late 1940-s due to the admission of Oslo and 
Copenhagen into NATO, the country became formally “free of alliances”. This 
concept and its synonym, “neutrality”, are widely used in both academic and po-
litical discussions to describe Swedish relation towards military blocs. To main-
tain its independent status and fighting capacity of its armed forces, the country 
invested heavily into its military production facilities during the Cold War [2]. De 
facto, Sweden assisted NATO in intelligence information exchange in the Baltic 
sea area and facilitated defense cooperation with Denmark and Norway. After 
the end of the Cold War Stockholm cut its armed forces and military production, 
and enhanced cooperation with NATO within the information exchange and the 
Partnership for Peace program. 
After gaining its sovereignty in 1917 and until 1947, Finland had a long-last-
ing conflict with the USSR due to territorial tensions, which included a threat to 
Leningrad from Finnish invasion and a possibility of closing the entrance to Gulf 
of Finland for Soviet vessels. Both countries developed a hostile image of its 
neighbor. These tensions led to the “Winter war” of the 1939-1940 and to Finnish 
participation in the war against the USSR on German side in 1941—1944. The 
contemporary Russian-Finnish border was established as the outcome of these 
conflicts. Finland was also to fulfill a number of obligations towards the Soviet 
Union, including those in the sphere of defense policy. Thus, Soviet troops were 
now stationed in Porkkala-Udd military base, a situation which lasted until 1956, 
when the peninsula once became Finnish sovereign territory and the troops had 
to leave the area. The ensuing military and defense cooperation between the two 
countries took the form of information exchange and Soviet military exports to 
Finland. Bilateral trade experienced a rapid growth, having at one point reached 
25% of all Finnish foreign trade [3], with bilateral cooperation in education, cul-
ture, youth exchange and twin cities programs [4] in tow. All of those forms of 
cooperation continued to grow after 1991, now with the Russian Federation. Ex-
perts and politicians have dubbed such a model of interaction “Finlandization”, 
thus defining a country formally free of alliances that gets sucked into coopera-
tion with a superpower — leader of an opposing bloc.
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While this topic is studied from a variety of perspectives, it remains highly po-
liticized. Since 1945 until now, the “freedom of alliances” of Sweden and Finland 
would usually be studied separately due to differences in historical experience of 
these countries and the peculiarities of their cooperation with superpowers. Thus, 
Sweden was known for its tight cooperation with Germany during the Second 
World War, and Finland had vast political obligations to one of the superpowers 
and extensive economic cooperation with it, now referred to as “finlandization”. 
Comparative studies of the two counties in this respect are a recent trend. 
At present we can consider two approaches as prevailing towards the subject. 
The first one, presented by M. Holmström in his book Hidden Alliance: secret 
bounds between Sweden and NATO [20], defines the Swedish bounds with the 
Alliance as a high level of integration into NATO structures even without formal 
membership. K. Korhonen uses the same approach towards Finland in his work 
A Transfer Treaty. In This Way Finland is Being Dragged [15], so do I. Novikova 
and N. Mezhevich [19]. The similarity is that all of them recognize the status of 
both countries as a “creeping integration” into NATO, reaching its highest possi-
ble level outside the formal membership in the bloc. The second approach stresses 
regional cooperation between two countries and their neighbors in defense policy 
regardless of the bloc affiliation, while maintaining that both countries preserve 
the “freedom of alliances”. The advocates of this approach include G. Åselius, 
H. Ojanen, J. Tarkka, T. Forsberg [2; 8; 13; 18]. These studies can also be framed 
as security culture analysis in defense strategy, connections with the certain part-
ners, or regionalism in international policy of a country. The proponents of this 
approach often position their work as analysis applicable for adjusting the gov-
ernmental course in the case. U. Möller and U. Bjergeld refer to “post-neutrality” 
concept as an evolving one, including a dynamic formal non-alignment strategy 
that is a subject to regular ‘revisits’ for political and ideological purposes [16].
Results and discussion
Discussions on the alignment of Sweden and Finland to NATO began in the 
early 1990s. After the reunification of Germany in autumn of 1990, the Finnish 
government announced that the Peace Treaty articles of 1947 concerning obliga-
tions of the country to repel German aggression lost their force. In addition, Fin-
land now considered itself free from military and technical restrictions stipulated 
by the Treaty. On January, 20 19922 the Russian Federation and Finland signed 
an agreement replacing the former Treaty on friendship, cooperation and mutual 
assistance between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of 
Finland originally signed on April 6, 1948 [5]. In accordance with the new agree-
ment, Finland was free to enter any political or military alliance with a third party 
[6, p. 206]. The “third party” war revealed shortly afterwards:  in his speech in 
2 Kuchinskaya, M. Kuda idut byvshie “Evroneitrali” (na primere Shveciji i Finlandii) [Where 
do former Euroneutrals go: the case of Finland and Sweden]. URL: https://riss.ru/images/
pdf/journal/2012/6/10.pdf (access date:26.09.2018) (in Russ.).
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May of 1992, the Finnish Prime Minister Esko Aho emphasized the historical sig-
nificance of NATO as a security guarantor for Denmark and Norway [8], which 
signaled the policy change towards NATO from Finnish perspective. 
Still, both Finland and Sweden maintain their official military non-alignment 
policies, which is explained, first of all, by geopolitical factors, namely by terri-
torial proximity to Russia and, accordingly, by heightened sensitivity to Russian 
take on the matter3.
The fact that NATO aims included crisis management and partnership devel-
opment with other countries made an impact to the approaches of Sweden and 
Finland towards their relations with the bloc. It correlated with the foreign policy 
objectives in both countries, which started to implement preventive diplomacy 
approach. In 1992 both countries became observers at the North Atlantic Co-
operation Council (NACC), which was later transformed into the Euro-Atlantic 
Partnership Council (EAPC). They also joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP) 
program4. Both Finland and Sweden participated in NATO operation aimed to 
implement the Dayton Agreements on Bosnia, and later in the Stabilization Force 
(SFOR)5. Moreover, both countries contributed to including Russia and the Baltic 
States in activities within the “Partnership for Peace” framework. Being more 
interested in stable relations with its Eastern neighbor, Finland, in contrast to 
Sweden, has been more active in lobbying Russia’s interests, in particular within 
the framework of the above-mentioned program. 
In Sweden, the need to revise the basic principles of foreign policy in the 
new international relations became a subject of active discussion in 1991, when 
Carl Bildt government came into power. The question of maintaining traditional 
neutrality in the foreign policy appeared on the agenda. Carl Bildt and leaders of 
the Christian Democratic party (Kristdemokraterna) and People’s liberal party 
(Folkpartiet — liberalerna) believed that the country should abandon its neutral 
status [9]. Anders Björck, the then Minister of Defense, argued that the country 
needed this to maintain the appropriate level of national security in the face of the 
planned cuts to military spending6. 
3 Valtioneuvoston ulko- ja turvallisuuspoliittinen selonteko [Government report on for-
eign and security policies] 2016. URL: http://valtioneuvosto.fi/documents/10616/1986338/
VNKJ072016_fi.pdf/9a3a074a-d97f-43c4-a1d8-e3ddbbd8d1da (access date: 22.11.2019); 
Bringéus K., Eriksson C.M. Säkerhet i ny tid. Betänkande av Utredningen om Sveriges förs-
vars- och säkerhetspolitiska samarbeten [Security in the new era. Report on defense and 
security policies of Sweden]. Stockholm, 2016. URL: http://www.sou.gov.se/wp-content/
uploads/2016/09/SOU-2016_57_webb.pdf (access date: 12.11.2019).
4 Trukhachev, V. NATO gotovit neozhidannyi “udar” po Evrope [NATO’s surprise “at-
tack” on Europe is in the works]. URL: https://www.pravda.ru/world/europe/europe-
an/22-08-2008/280291-nato-0/ (access date: 26.09.2018) (in Russ.).
5 According to Dayton agreements NATO troops (Implementation Force — IFOR) entered 
Bosnia and Herzegovina on November 21, 1995. The SFOR mission emerged according to 
the UN Security Council Resolution No. 1088 on December 12, 1996 as IFOR continuation. 
6 Malmqvist, H. Shvecija i NATO: 23 goda spustya [Sweden and NATO: 23 years down 
the road]. URL: https://www.nato.int/docu/Review/2018/Also-in-2018/sweden-and-nato-23-
years-down-the-road-defence-security/RU/index.htm (access date: 26.09.2018) (in Russ.).
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The thesis, that the country would “preserve the non-alignment principle to-
wards military alliances in order to maintain the neutrality in case of war” was 
a compromise achieved within the Swedish political elites after this discussion 
of the first half of the 1990s7. In the end of the 1995 the Swedish Parliament re-
instated the two principles of the country’s foreign policy — maintaining both 
neutrality and high defense capability. Anna Lindh, the new Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of Sweden noted during her speech at the Swedish Institute of Internation-
al Relations in 1998 that neutrality still contributed to security in the Baltic Sea 
region  [21, p. 180-181].
Still, the Swedish army actively cooperates with NATO by participating in 
military exercises and joint operations. The economic argument is still on the 
agenda, too: since the Swedish army requires significant annual funding, amount-
ing to 1.7% of the country’s GDP, the NATO membership is often seen by the 
Swedish politicians as an opportunity to cut national defense expenditures [10]. 
The special role of Sweden in relations with NATO is also manifested in the 
sub-regional Nordic Defense Cooperation program established in 2009 that in-
cludes Sweden, Finland and three NATO members: Denmark, Iceland and Nor-
way. While outside NATO, Sweden has a position similar to the Alliance making 
sure there is a unity of defense policy among the Nordic Defense Cooperation 
countries. In 2014, Sweden denounced Crimea’s merging into Russia and joined 
anti-Russian sanctions. In April 2014, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark and 
Iceland signed an agreement on enforcing their military cooperation. Some ana-
lysts have already dubbed this alliance an “Atlantic mini-NATO”. Sweden also 
restored its military presence on Gotland8. Politicians link the decision on the de-
ployment of troops to the Ukrainian crisis and the Swedish position on the Crime-
an issue. In May 2016, Riksdag ratified a cooperation treaty, allowing the NATO 
contingent to participate in military exercises on Swedish territory. Additionally, 
in case of war, Sweden is to be ready to host the NATO troops9.
The Ukrainian crisis became a subject to reflection in the strategic document 
of the Moderate Coalition Party (Moderaterna), in the part dealing with defense 
policy. “Russian aggression in the Ukraine alongside with growing military ac-
tivities of Russia has led to growth of tensions and military conflict risks. Sweden 
can be a subject to involvement into them”, reads the document. It further em-
7 Kuchinskaya, M. Kuda idut byvshie “Evroneitrali” (na primere Shveciji i Finlandii) [Where 
do former Euroneutrals go: the case of Finland and Sweden]. URL: https://riss.ru/images/
pdf/journal/2012/6/10.pdf (access date:26.09.2018) (in Russ.).
8 During the period of 2005 to 2016, there were no regular military units of the Swedish army 
on Gotland. In September 2016, military exercises of 150 motorized infantry company were 
held there; the company, upon completion of the exercises, was ordered to remain on Gotland 
on a permanent basis.
9 Bringéus K., Eriksson C. M. Säkerhet i ny tid. Betänkande av Utredningen om Sverigg-
es försvars- och säkerhetspolitiska samarbeten. Elanders Sverige AB, Stockholm, Sweden. 
URL: http://www.sou.gov.se/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/SOU-2016_57_webb.pdf (access 
date: 31.01.2020).
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phasizes that “contemporary threats towards global security appear to be more 
complex than before, which justifies the unification of efforts and cooperation 
development with other countries and organizations, including NATO”10.
The position of the ruling Social Democratic party on the issue of the “free-
dom of alliances” (Alliansfrihet)11 is that Sweden should preserve cooperation 
with NATO within certain programs, in peace-keeping operations sanctioned by 
the UN, in struggle against international terrorism, or in defense cooperation in 
the Baltic sea area. Social democrats state that the country should avoid partici-
pation in military operations held without the UN sanction. 
The third most influential party in the country (17,6% in 2018 General elec-
tions), the conservative nationalist Swedish Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna), 
advocates for the increase of military expenses up to 2,5% of the GDP and en-
forcing the Armed forces without NATO membership. The party maintains that 
NATO membership is an unprofitable affair since Sweden can be subject to in-
volvement into war on the side of the Alliance. Furthermore, “the majority of 
Swedish people will protest against risking the lives of their soldiers to forward 
the interests of foreign state”. What generally remains supported is the coopera-
tion with the Baltic sea area states, and the Partnership for Peace program12. The 
“Russian threat” is a subject to discussion in the party’s strategic documents as 
one of the key determiners of foreign policy. 
To sum up, three major political parties of Sweden do not have a shared po-
sition on Swedish “freedom of alliances”. The Moderates rely heavily on the 
“Russian threat”, Social democrats and Swedish democrats justify their position 
through calls to participation in peace-keeping missions and answering global 
threats. The parties either avoid mentioning NATO membership, or claim it is 
irrelevant for national interests. Yet the NATO membership issue remains one of 
the those having the most potential to provoke a breakup in the Swedish political 
elite and to become a detonator to a more general political crisis. 
NATO membership advocates in Finland remain a minority, though disputes 
on the issue have been taking place for a long time. NATO expansion to the east 
launched in the 1990s after the unification of Germany and the fall of communist 
regimes in Central and Eastern Europe stimulated this discussion. Max Jakobson, 
a well-known Finnish diplomat and political observer was one of the ideologists 
for the country’s accession to the Alliance. He believed that the admission of 
Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary to NATO in 1999 had shifted the balance 
of forces in Europe, and reinstated the need for reconsideration of Swedish and 
10 Moderaterna. Den nya svenska Modellen. URL: https://moderaterna.se/forsvar (access date: 
01.12.2018).
11 The concept is implemented in documents and materials of Social Democratic party to-
wards neutrality. E.g.: Socialdemokraterna. Alliansfrihet (21.02.2018). URL: https://www.
socialdemokraterna.se/var-politik/a-till-o/Alliansfrihet// (access date: 30.11.2018)
12 Sverigedemokraterna. Forsvarspolitik. URL: https://sd.se/vad-vi-vill/forsvarspolitik/ (ac-
cess date: 02.12.2018).
30 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Finnish neutrality13. At the same time, he noted that it is a shared fear in Fin-
land that acceptance of the Baltic states into NATO would undermine stability in 
Northern Europe, and, thus, the relations with Russia. According to Max Jakob-
son, the position of Sweden and Finland regarding their possible accession to the 
Alliance will not change the intentions of Russia in maintaining of its dominance 
in the Baltic region. Thus, there is no sense to connect the position of Finland 
with the perceived reaction of a country whose actions the Finnish government 
is unable to influence. He further argued that “if NATO were to remain the guar-
antor of European security, Finland and Sweden with their neutral status could 
turn out to be in the position of secondary players in the decision-making process 
regarding European security”14.
In Finland, the official course of the government remains the same despite 
the debate on tentative NATO membership: Finland does not join the existing 
military blocs, NATO membership is seen as a very distant perspective for the 
future15. The 1995 government report, Security in the Changing World, contained 
a statement that within all changes happening in Europe, “Finland would contin-
ue to pursue a non-alignment policy towards military alliances and that Finland 
managed to create a world-trusted reliable defense potential on its own”16. The 
Finnish military command has always emphasized that the independent defense 
capability of the country is the only reliable guarantor of avoiding war in case 
of any insignificant crisis17. According to many Finnish politicians, accession to 
NATO is not an absolute necessity, as for Finland there is no need in any security 
guarantees from the bloc. On the contrary, accession to the NATO would signifi-
cantly change the situation and create a threat to the stability in the region.
Inside Finland, there is a small group of politicians who support the idea of 
joining NATO. Originally, this group mainly consisted of members of the “Young 
Finns” minority party (Nuorsuomalaiset) led by Ristö Penttilä. In addition, the 
13 Rebro, O. Oboronnaya pilitika Finlandii i Shveciji: perspektivy vstuplenija v NATO 
(Sweden’s and Finland’s defence policy: NATO ascension prospects). URL: http://www.
foreignpolicy.ru/analyses/oboronnaya-politika-finlyandii-i-shvetsii-perpektivy-vstupleniya-
v-nato/ (access date: 26.09.2018) (in Russ.).
14 Jacobson, M. Strakhovka po-finski (Finnish insurance) URL: http://www.rg.ru/2004/02/20/
finlyandiya.html (access date: 26.09.2018) (in Russ.).
15 Bergquist M., Heisbourg F., Nyberg R., Tiilikainen T. Arvio Suomen mahdollisen Nato-
jäsenyyden vaikutuksista. Suomen ulkoasianministeriö, Helsinki, 2016. URL: https://julkai-
sut.valtioneuvosto.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/79159/IP1601374_UM_Nato-arvioFI_13371.
pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (access date: 26.09.2018).
16 In: Mikhailov, D. Politika nacionalnoi bezopasnosti Severnych stran posle okonchanija 
Holodnoi Voiny: problem I perspektivi Severnogo sotrudnichestva (National security poli-
cies of the Nordic Countries after the Cold War: issues and perspectives of Northern coopera-
tion) URL: http://old.nasledie.ru/politvne/18_10/article.php?art=29 (access date: 12.03.2020) 
(in Russ.).
17 Malyshkin, A. RF v koltse “druzej”: Shvecija i Finlandija zadumalis o chlenstve v NATO 
[“Encircled” by friends: Sweden and Finland are thinking of joining NATO]. URL: https://
ria.ru/world/20140903/1022627620.html (access date: 26.09.2018) (in Russ.).
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former head of the EU Military Committee and Defense Minister of Finland, 
General Gustav Hägglund, actively supported the idea of joining NATO. In 2004, 
he presented the idea of turning the common foreign policy of the EU into a 
“European pillar” of NATO. While the “American pillar of NATO”, according to 
Hägglund, was to be engaged in global struggle against terrorism, the “European 
pillar” was to ensure the regional crisis management18 [1]. Finnish researcher 
Christen Pursiainen believes that admission of the country to NATO is necessary 
since Finland indirectly supports the idea that Russia and NATO are opponents. 
According to Pursiainen, NATO membership will give the country new oppor-
tunities for further integration of Russia into Western institutions: being outside 
NATO, Finland also remains outside the development of relations between NATO 
and Russia and therefore cannot influence significant number of factors directly 
related to its security [1, p. 27]. However, the official position of Helsinki is that 
of non-alignment with military alliances.
A well-known Finnish politician, one of the candidates during presidential 
elections in 2018, Matti Vanhanen, welcomed the partnership and discussion on 
closer cooperation between Finland and NATO, but emphasized that it would 
not be a step towards the membership in the alliance19. Finnish President Saule 
Niinistö and former Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander Stubb are both ac-
tively promoting the NATO membership idea. In his interview in 2014, Stubb 
stated that he was the one who personally supported membership of the country 
in NATO, but did not think that it was the moment for it. The fact that only 25% 
of Finns approved this idea was very important20. Finnish President Saule Niinistö 
believes that the early 1990s seemed to be a good time for joining NATO, but 
the opportunity has since passed21. At the same time, Erkki Tuomioja, Minister 
of Foreign Affairs between 2011 and 2015 gave this evasive assessment of the 
country’s possible NATO membership: “according to the Government official 
strategy, Finland is not a member of any military alliance, but it cooperates with 
NATO and maintains the possibility of applying for membership22.
The Finnish advocates of NATO membership put forward a number of ar-
guments, the first of which is national security. According to them, even under 
the threat of losing some of its sovereignty, the country should seek protection 
18 Sierla A. Suomen mahdollisen Nato-jäsenyyden vaikutukset. Suomen ulkoasianministeriö. 
Helsinki, 2007. URL: editex.filmuut_julkaisut/4931 (access date: 26.09.2018).
19 Ibid.
20 In: Yermolayeva, N. Finlandia ne budet vstupat’ v NATO [Finland will not join NATO] // 
Rossijskaya gazeta. 30.09.2014. URL: https://rg.ru/2014/09/30/finlandiya-site-anons.html 
(access date: 26.09.2018) (in Russ.).
21 Tasavallan presidentti Sauli Niinistön uudenvuodenpuhe. 01.1.2015. URL: http://president-
ti.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=319058&nodeid=44810&contentlan=1&culture=fi-FI. 
(access date: 05.10.2016).
22 Budut li Shvecija i Finlandija v NATO? [Will Sweden and Finland join NATO?]. URL: httS-
ps://topwar.ru/33690-budut-li-shveciya-i-finlyandiya-v-nato. html (access date: 26.09.2018) 
(in Russ.).
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from the more powerful political player. To this end, a number of Finns believe 
terrorism and imperial ambitions of Russia to be the main threats to international 
security [12; 13]. The second argument stipulates that joining NATO can raise 
the status and significance of Finland. Conversely, the authors of the monograph 
Northern Europe: Region of New Development believe that Finland and Sweden 
ascension into NATO can significantly reduce the ability of these countries to 
play significant role in the European Union. The present system of regional and 
sub-regional cooperation (above all, the cooperation with Russia) may also suffer 
as a result of such development [14, p. 418—440].
The political establishment of Finland also has critics of the country’s tentative 
NATO membership. They believe that it will turn Finland into a convenient base 
for Alliance’s military infrastructure close to the Russian border. Many Finnish 
politicians maintain that NATO wants its non-member partners to more actively 
participate in crisis management and decision-making programs so that the Alli-
ance could have more trained military specialists in complicated missions. The 
former Finnish ambassador in the Russian Federation, Heikki Talvitie, believes 
that the country’s admission to NATO would not lead to security improvement, 
because Western countries are not really interested in the defense of the Finnish 
territory. The size of the hypothetical help from the Alliance, as well as prepared-
ness of other member states to provide it, are subjects to doubts. Therefore, it 
would be unreasonable for Finland to start a confrontation with Russia, having 
such an illusory security guarantees from NATO. While not doubting the long-
term benefits of joining the Alliance, Heikki Talvitie argued against this process 
speeding up, since it would spell complications on the border with Russia23.
In the meantime, significant efforts have been made to involve Finland in the 
North Atlantic Alliance [15]: the armed forces and weapon systems of the coun-
try have been changed according to NATO standards, while practical interaction 
skills of the troops have been developed during joint military exercises and in 
the framework of the Partnership for Peace program. In 2013, wishing to em-
phasize good relations with the NATO, Finland ordered various types of missiles 
and additional equipment from the USA for a total of $277 million24. Admiral 
Juhani Kaskeala said that the Finnish army was fully ready to join NATO; this 
statement, made by the former commander of the Finnish army in 2001-2009 
confirms that there are no guarantees that “freedom of alliances” means eternal 
neutrality [6; 16].
In their foreign and defense policies, both countries wish to maintain coop-
eration with NATO in order to keep stability in the Baltic region: “NATO is the 
only international organization which is capable of holding the military crisis 
23 Talvitie, H. Finlandii net neobhodimosti vstupat’ v NATO “iz principa” [Finland has no 
intention of joining NATO “out of spite”] (“Keskisuomalainen”, Finland). URL: http://apn-nn.
com/90527-510357.html (access date: 26.09.2018) (in Russ.).
24 Budut li Shvecija i Finlandija v NATO? [Will Sweden and Finland join NATO?]. URL: https://
topwar.ru/33690-budut-li-shveciya-i-finlyandiya-v-nato. html (access date: 26.09.2018) (in 
Russ.).
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management and handling peacekeeping operations”, and “NATO expansion has 
increased the level of security of the territories adjacent to Finland” [17, p. 28]. 
Many Swedish politicians emphasize that not a single major European state 
should unilaterally dominate in Northern Europe, and the presence of the United 
States is thus seen as a counterbalance to such an occurrence. Furthermore, both 
countries welcome various “non-military” cooperation with NATO: e.g., in min-
imizing environmental footprint of military activities, conducting peacekeeping 
operations, or in responding to crises [10]. The Partnership for Peace program is 
of particular importance for Finland and Sweden, since the central part of cooper-
ation is connected with the increasing interoperability of the participating armed 
forces for improved success of joint operations25. It is important to emphasize that 
operations under the Alliance command with the participation of partner coun-
tries are recognized as primary response to the possible European crises whithin 
the foreign policy doctrines of both Nordic countries under consideration, al-
though the EU with its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is also seen 
an important tool in this regard. 
In the early 2000s, Swedish and Finnish support for transatlantic solidarity 
increased, especially after the events of September 11, 2001. Finnish and Swed-
ish foreign ministers declared that “if an EU member state were under a ter-
rorist attack, both Finland and Sweden would undoubtedly provide appropriate 
assistance”26. Both countries made steps in this direction by proposing improve-
ments in the functions of the Council of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership in order 
to address this threat. Neither Helsinki nor Stockholm consider an alternative to 
NATO when it comes to the demands of war on terrorism. 
What is certain is that Finland and Sweden will only join NATO if they feel 
a real threat. In the early 1990s Swedish Foreign Minister Margaretha af Ugglas 
stressed that non-alignment policy was only a means, but not an end in itself27. Yet 
this is the furthest the Swedish government has gone in its official statements to 
date. Despite the repeated declarations being made by both conservatives (from 
the Moderate Coalition Party, Moderaterna) and liberals (Liberalerna) about the 
necessity to join NATO, the government firmly follows its formal line. 
The Social Democrat Erkki Tuomioja, who from 2011 to 2015 served as the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Finland, believes that his country should consider 
the possibility of closer military cooperation with Sweden. The integration of 
25 Petrov, V., Ognev, A. Programma NATO “Partnerstvo radi mira” [NATO’s Partnership 
for Peace program] (2013). URL: http://factmil.com/publ/strana/avstrija/programma_nato_
partnjorstvo_radi_mira_2013/54-1-0-351 (access date: 26.09.2018) (in Russ.)
26  Kantokoski, O. Sotrudnichestvo stran Skandinavii i Finlandii v sfere borbi s mezhdunarodnim 
terrorismom [Cooperation of Scandinavian countries and Finland in the war on international 
terrorism]. URL: http://www.kunstkamera.ru/lib/rubrikator/03/03_05/978-5-88431-162-6/ 
(access date: 26.09.2018) (in Russ.)
27 Poplavsky, A. Formirovanie politiki bezopasnosti Norvegii i Shvecii v 1990-e g.g. [Devell-
opment of Norway’s and Sweden’s security policies in the 1990s]. URL: http://www. evolu-
tio.info/content/view/907/215/ (access date: 26.09.2018) (in Russ.)
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air and sea defense systems of the two countries is proposed to be one of the 
areas of cooperation28. Today many politicians in Finland and Sweden declare 
that military cooperation between the two states is the main priority of their de-
fense policy. It is too early to talk about the emergence of a new military bloc, 
but the Swedish-Finnish interaction is likely to lead to the creation of a legally 
defined defense alliance. The image of Russian foreign policy as “hostile” or “ag-
gressive” may serve as a trigger to such a process. For example, the Command-
er-in-Chief of Swedish armed forces29, General Michael Bydén directly stated 
that the possibility of conflict between NATO and Russia had rapidly grown. 
During his visit to Lithuania in February 2016, he emphasized that “the arrival 
of NATO military equipment to the region during the Russian demonstration of 
willingness to use military means to pursue its political goals” makes conflict and 
provocations more likely30.
At the moment the Swedish Ministry of Defense is studying legal implications 
of signing such an agreement with Finland. The former Prime Minister of Fin-
land, Matti Vanhanen, is confident that the creation of such a union can serve as 
the main component for further development of the joint security apparatus. He 
supports the point of view that it is essential to be very careful in matters of war 
and peace.  Finland, says Matti Vanhanen, can never be sure that, if necessary, 
its neighbor’s resources will be at Finnish disposal especially if cooperation with 
Sweden takes place on a voluntary basis. Vanhanen is also convinced that a de-
fense alliance between the two countries cannot even be possible unless the two 
states have a shared foreign policy. Only in this case a true union between two 
national states is feasible, says he31 [18, р. 1177]. A bilateral treaty and a defensive 
alliance, in his opinion, would allow to overcome various uncertainties of the 
future, as well as to outline the framework for using common resources. 
The Chairman of the Defense Commission of the Swedish Parliament, Allan 
Widman, believes that the government of Sweden, first of all, needs to identify 
long-term prospects for Swedish-Finnish cooperation. The Liberal Party (Lib-
eralerna), of which Allan Widman is a member, generally supports the creation 
of a military alliance, which is considered to be a step towards a possible NATO 
membership. The Moderate Coalition Party (Moderaterna) support this position, 
urging the government to create a roadmap for Sweden to join NATO. The Mod-
erates believe that the amendments to the NATO-Sweden Host Nation Support 
28 Bondina, V. Finlandia i Shvecija mogut sozdat’ novy voenny sojuz: protiv kogo? [Finn-
land and Sweden to possibly create a new military alliance: against whom?]. URL: http://
gpolitika.com/evropa/finlyandiya-i-shveciya-mogut-sozdat-voennyj-soyuz-protiv-kogo.html 
(access date: 26.09.2018) (in Russ.)
29 The Commander-in-Chief of the Swedish armed forces  (Swedish: Överbefälhavaren) — is 
a highest ranking military officer in Sweden, or Swedish Chief of Defense in NATO’s ter-
minology.
30 In: Bondina, V. Ibid. 
31 In: Malyshkin, A. Ibid. 
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agreement (2014) to be proposed today still leave the kingdom isolated, unpro-
tected and without any guarantees that the Alliance will help in case of war. This 
treaty already allows NATO to send troops across the territory of Sweden, but only 
in peacetime. The document also allows for the participation of NATO forces in 
military exercises within the territory of Sweden. At the moment, some changes 
to this document, for example those allowing the Alliance troops to move across 
the country not only in peacetime but also in the case a military conflict, are being 
considered by the Swedish politicians. 
However, two-thirds of the citizens of both states believe that military issues 
should be solved independently from the other country.  At the same time, ap-
proximately every fourth of the citizens is in favor of a common defense policy 
of the two states32. According to Swedish experts, the reason for such beliefs in 
their country is not the distrust for its neighbor, but a generally shared skepticism 
towards military blocs. Apparently, the same can be said about the Finns.
This conclusion is confirmed indirectly by the attitude towards NATO. More 
than half of the Finnish citizens participating in the survey about the issue are 
convinced that cooperation with NATO should not be extended. In Sweden, ap-
proximately the same number of citizens express the same views. In both coun-
tries, about 40% of those surveyed are in favor of deepening cooperation with 
NATO33. Sociologists believe that the number of supporters of NATO member-
ship has increased after the Crimea merged into Russia, but people holding such 
views still remain a minority. The voices of the “Atlanticists” appear only at the 
level of certain parties or as personal opinions. For instance, Swedish liberals 
from the Center Party (Centerpartiet) propose to reconsider the neutral status of 
the country. However, as noted above, the political elites of both countries con-
tinue to demonstrate restraint in this matter34.
The balance in Northern Europe in general and in the Baltic region in par-
ticular will change if Finland and Sweden, with their highly developed military 
potential, join NATO. The line of contact between Russia and NATO member 
states will run across the entire northern part of Europe from the Barents sea to 
Kaliningrad and Pskov [6]. Russia will have to develop different scenarios for 
carrying out of its policies towards the Baltic sea states and the North Atlantic 
Alliance, to consider its options for resolving the issue of guarantees of its own 
security, including mutually beneficial conditions for the countries of the region35. 
Regular mutual state visits of the presidents of Russia and Finland prove that the 
process of forming of a new political course is underway. Considering the Baltic 
states admission to NATO and emergence of NATO troops in close proximity to 
32 In: Malyshkin, A. Ibid.
33 In: Yermolaeva, N. Ibid.
34 Muilu H. (2016). Miten Suomen ja Ruotsin Nato-selvitykset eroavat toisistaan? URL: http://
yle.fi/uutiset/3-9155066 (access date: 27.02.2020).
35 Zharsky, A., Korshunov, E. Severnye sosedi: proshai neitralitet [Northern neighbors: good-
bye, neutrality]. URL: https://vpk-news.ru/articles/5540 (access date: 26.09.2018) (in Russ.).
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St. Petersburg, the Finnish factor is to become the decisive one for security in the 
North-Western Russian frontiers. It is also crucial to maintain free exit from the 
Gulf of Finland, unimpeded sea communication with the Kaliningrad region and 
the Atlantic Ocean, as well as the possibility for laying of gas mains under the 
Baltic Sea.
When asked about the possibility of Finland’s joining NATO, the Russian Pres-
ident Vladimir Putin replied, “This issue comes up so often in various political 
and public circles in Finland. You are well aware of our attitude towards the ex-
pansion of military-political blocs in general and to that of the North Atlantic Al-
liance in particular. We do not think it will help to enhance security in the world. 
Finland is a full member of the Western community of countries and a member 
of the European Union. Bringing NATO’s military infrastructure closer to Rus-
sian borders by expanding it into Finnish territory will not improve relations be-
tween our countries, but what is more important is that today’s threats are mostly 
in the area of fighting terrorism, drugs trafficking, human trafficking, organized 
crime, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of their deliv-
ery. We can only resolve these problems by working together and outside blocs. 
As far as I know, the Finnish leadership shares this view. Still, the final choice is 
up to the Finnish people and leadership”36.
Former Prime Minister of Finland, and a candidate for presidential elections of 
2018, Matti Vanhanen, believes that joining NATO would be a “genuine choice” 
for Finland, despite the fact that Russian risks would be counted in37. In his opin-
ion, Finland’s interest in NATO has been spiked by Russia’s actions and sub-
sequent aggressive behavior in the region. Timo Soini, the current Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of Finland, emphasizes the importance of common security and 
defense policy of the EU, but at the same time, in his opinion, the very possibility 
of his country joining NATO should serve as a background for that38.
Conclusion
The discussion on the possibility of admission of Finland and Sweden to 
NATO faced the following issues in the political establishments of the two coun-
tries: 
1) Stockholm and Helsinki strategy in pursuing contacts with the Alliance: 
both countries have tight connections with NATO through programs, cooperation 
36 Latukhina, K. Putin predupredil o posledstvijah vstuplenija Finlandii v NATO [Putin 
warned of the consequences of Finland’s joining NATO]. URL: https://rg.ru/2016/07/01/pu-
tin-predupredil-o-posledstviiah-vstupleniia-finliandii-v-nato.html (access date: 26.09.2018) 
(in Russ.).
37 In: Bondina, V. Ibid. 
38 In: Domínguez Cebrián B. No veo la necesidad de un Ejército europeo. El Pais (22.01.2018). 
URL: https://elpais.com/internacional/2018/01/18/actualidad/1516296250_831321.html (ac-
cess date: 20.02.2020).
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boards, joint operations and attempts to participate in both executive and deci-
sion-making institutions. The fight against terrorism appears to be the corner stone 
of these efforts. Despite that, the NATO membership on its own is not considered 
acceptable, albeit in the long term. Both countries make bilateral cooperation in 
defense a higher priority. Yet, Finnish political leaders have recently expressed 
an opinion that NATO membership is a “necessary”, but “missed” opportunity. 
Sweden, on the other hand, follows the “freedom of alliances” principle strictly. 
Cooperation within the EU defense structures appears to be a priority for both 
countries, despite its role as a catalyst for “creeping integration” into NATO; 
2) Main advocates and opponents in governments and political parties: in 
general, right-centric and liberal parties have shown themselves as supportive of 
NATO membership. In Sweden these are the Moderate-coalitionist party (Mod-
eraterna), the Center party (Centerpartiet) and the Liberal party (Liberalerna); in 
Finland it is the National coalition party. Social democrats and nationalist parties 
oppose tentative NATO membership, positioning it as an additional obligation to 
their countries with a minimal coverage of possible expenses;
3) Positions of military command and military potential: both countries had 
completed rearmament and restructuring of their Armed forces according to the 
NATO standards. Military command of both countries in general claims the max-
imum level of preparedness to NATO admission. Here, the difference between 
Sweden and Finland lies in military industry potential: while Sweden is able to 
cover the needs of its Armed forces with its own facilities and minimal arms im-
port, Finland depends on military imports. The position of Stockholm is connect-
ed to its military industry extension and positioning the country as independent 
from major international players. For Finland, on the contrary, the position of 
Russia is a factor the Finnish military command and government need to con-
sider as a sensitive one, despite their active participation in NATO initiatives and 
programs;
4) Tentative referendum on NATO membership appears to indicate political 
defeat of the Alliance advocates. It is based on the sociological surveys, and on 
the General elections results: NATO advocates from the Moderate Party (Mod-
eraterna) lost a majority in Riksdag, while the Swedish Democrats turned out to 
become the third party in the parliament due to the protest voting. These factors 
indicate grounds for political breakup in the Swedish elites;
5) General perspective on NATO membership in both countries: in both cases 
it is presented as a “long-lasting perspective”. Instead of underlining the military 
power of the Alliance, both Stockholm and Helsinki put an emphasis on crisis 
management and preventive diplomacy, as accompanied by EU defense initia-
tives. The issues of the de-facto “freedom of alliances” have moved to the back-
ground, making the “creeping integration” into NATO structures possible. So the 
formal “freedom of alliances” of either Sweden or Finland, especially when it 
comes to relationships with Russia, seems illusory from that perspective. 
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